This paper proposes a two-step aggregation method for measuring long-term income inequality and income mobility, where mobility is defined as an equalizer of long-term income. First, the income stream of each individual is aggregated into a measure of permanent income, which accounts for the costs associated with income fluctuations. Consequently, mobility will have an unambiguously positive impact on social welfare in the sense that for two societies that have identical short term income distributions, the social welfare will be greatest for the socie ty which exhibits most mobility.
Introduction
More than half a century ago, Friedman (1962) suggested that a proper understanding of income inequality requires taking income mobility into account. The line of reasoning was that high annual income inequality might occur side by side with little or no long-term income inequality, if individuals' positions in the annual income distributions change over time. This motivated a considerable theoretical and empirical literature, starting with Shorrocks (1978) , where mobility is defined as an equaliser of long-term or permanent incomes.
1 This notion of mobility is measured as the change in income inequality when extending the accounting period of income, and requires aggregation in two steps. The first step consists of aggregating the income stream of each individual into an interpersonal comparable measure of permanent income, whereas the second step deals with the problem of aggregating the individual permanent incomes into measures of social welfare, inequality, and mobility. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a framework for measuring income mobility that contributes to the existing literature in both regards.
In Shorrocks (1978) as well as in most subsequent empirical studies of income mobility, the average (real) income over several years is used as an approximation for permanent income. 2 . This means that the two-period income streams (50, 100) and (75, 75) will be considered to produce the same level of permanent income. Accordingly, this approach pays no attention to the fact that mobility may imply income instability for the individuals which will matter for their welfare if it is costly to transfer income between time periods. In fact, this problem was acknowledged by Shorrocks (1978) , and is a common criticism of studies of mobility as an equaliser of long-term average incomes (see e.g. Chakravarty et al., 1985; Aktinson et. al., 1992; Fields and Ok, 1999; Aaberge et al., 2002) .
To develop a method for measuring mobility where high mobility, everything else equal, is socially preferable , it is necessary to introduce a measure of permanent income that incorporates the costs of and constraints on making inter-period income transfers. To this end, we draw on the intertemporal choice theory and define permanent income as the minimum annual expenditure an individual would need in order to be as well off as he could be by undertaking inter-period income transfers. The minimum annual expenditure will be denoted the equally allocated equivalent income. To justify interpersonal comparison of the equally allocated equivalent incomes, we follow standard practice in assuming that the inter-period income transfers are carried out in accordance with an intertemporal 1 We refer to, Chakravarty et al. (1985) , Atkinson et al. (1992) , Dardanoni (1993) , Ok (1996, 1999) and Gottschalk and Spolare (2002) for discussions of alternative definitions of mobility. 2 A number of studies measure long-term inequality and mobility based on average income, including Shorrocks (1978) , Chakravarty et al. (1985) , Bjørklund (1993) , Gustafsson (1994) , Burkhauser and Puopore (1997) , Maasoumi and Trede (2001) , Aaberge et al. (2002) , Ruiz-Castello (2004) , and Ayala and Sastre (2004) . utility function that is common to all individuals. The common intertemporal utility function is to be determined by the social planner, and can be viewed as a normative standard where individuals are treated symmetrically. 3 Provided that the instantaneous utility term of the intertemporal utility function belongs to the much used Bergson family, our permanent income measure proves to be equal to the utility-equivalent annuity introduced by Nordhaus (1973) . Nordhaus (1973) and Creedy (1999) express, however, concerns about the sensitivity of distributional analysis based on the utility-equivalent annuity measure to the choice of preference parameters. As will be demonstrated below, their concern is uncalled for because the utility-equivalent annuity proves to be the product of two terms; one that is a function of the income stream and another that is a function of the preference parameters. Since the latter term is common to all individuals, measures of inequality and mobility will (due to scale -invariance) solely depend on the income stream term. This result provides a theoretical underpinning to using the annuity of an individual's income stream as a measure of permanent income in studies of long-term inequality and mobility.
While the first aggregation step maps the income stream of each individual into a measure of permanent income, the purpose of the second step is to aggregate permanent incomes across individuals into measures of long-term income inequality, social welfare and income mobility, when the state of immobility is defined as no changes over time in individuals' ranks in the short term distributions of income. This calls for measures of mobility that are derived from rank-dependent measures of inequality of the type introduced by Mehran (1976) and Yaari (1988) . The Mehran-Yaari family of rank-dependent measures of inequality can be considered as a weighted sum of income shares where the weights depend on population shares but not on the income shares. To illustrate the shortcoming of these inequality measures, consider a population divided into a group of poor and a group of rich, where each individual's income is equal to the corresponding group mean. Applying the Mehran-Yaari family of inequality measures, the inequality reduction of an income transfer from the rich to the poor will depend solely on relative number of poor people, irrespective of their share of total income. To account for the impact of population shares as well as income shares, we introduce a more general family of rank-dependent measures of inequality which is justified to represent an ordering relation on the set of Lorenz curves. Due to their convenient expressions, it is straightforward to estimate these inequality measures, which supplement each other with regard to sensitivity to changes in the lower, the central and the upper part of the income distribution. A subfamily of this generalized family of rank-dependent measures of inequality is shown to be associated with social welfare functions that prove to have intuitive ly appealing interpretations.
Further, the new general family of inequality measures provides several alternative instructive interpretations of the Gini coefficient.
Finally, we introduce a new family of rank-dependent measures of income mobility that rely on (i) the introduced measure of permanent income, and (ii) the general family of rank-dependent measures of income inequality. On this basis, income mobility is defined as the reduction in inequality in the distribution of permanent income due to changes over time in individuals' ranks and income shares in the short term distributions of income. Mobility will have an unambiguously positive impact on social welfare in the sense that if two societies have identical short term income distributions , then social welfare will be greatest for the society which exhibits most mobility. The proposed family of rankdependent measures of income mobility also proves to encompass standard measures of income mobilit y, depending on the assumptions made by the social planner about the intertemporal preferences of individuals and the credit market.
Section 2 proceeds by describing the method for aggregating the income streams of individuals into comparable measures of permanent income. Section 3 deals with the problem of aggregating permanent incomes across individuals into measures of long-term inequality and social welfare.
Section 4 introduces a new family of rank-dependent measures of income mobility, whereas Section 5 summarizes the main results of the paper and relates them to alternative approaches to measuring longterm inequality and income mobility.
Definition and measurement of permanent income
Below, we propose a method for measuring permanent income that conforms to the basic structure of intertemporal choice theory, and justifies comparison of permanent incomes across individuals. First, we consider the case of a perfect credit market, before extending the method to account for credit market imperfections.
Perfect credit market

Equally allocated equivalent income
In analysis of long-term income inequality and mobility, the problem of interpersonal comparability of income streams arises. To get round this problem, we employ a utility function that is common to all individuals. The common utility function is to be determined by the social planner based on his ethical value judgement, and contains within it interpersonal comparability of both welfare levels and welfare differences. Rather than claiming that the common utility function is a descriptively accurate representation of the behaviour of heterogeneous individuals, it is justified as a normative standard where the social planner treats individuals symmetrically after adjusting for relevant non-income heterogeneity, such as employing equivalence scales to adjust for household size and composition. Specifically, our permanent income measure is defined as the minimum annual expenditure an individual would need in order to be as well off as he could be by undertaking inter-period income transfers according to a common intertemporal utility function subject to his budget constraints.
To provide a formal counterpart to this definition, the social planner is assumed to employ the conventional discounted utility model with perfect foresight, where preferences are intertemporal separable and additive. 4 The instantaneous common utility function u is assumed to be stationary, increasing, concave, and differentiable. Furthermore, we assume that the rate of time preference δ is non-negative and constant over time. 
As is well known, the preferred consumption level in period t, * t C , can be expressed as a function of the preferred consumption level in period 1 4 See Koopmans (1960) for an attempt to axiomatically justify the discounted utility model in general, and Kahneman et al. (1997) for an axiomatic rationalisation of the assumption of additive separability in instantaneous utility. As is well known, the discounted utility model can straightforwardly be extended to allow for uncertainty. 5 It is straightforward to extent the budget constraint to account for wealth, e.g. by assuming that the income in the first period Y i1 in (2.2) includes the initial stock of wealth. Inter-period income transfers are carried out to ensure that the marginal utility of consumption is constant over time, which generally will result in preferred consumption levels that differ between time periods. By inserting for (2.4) in (2.1) the maximum utility level (U) is given by The minimum annual expenditure Z will be denoted the equally allocated equivalent income (EAEI).
Since the individual -specific EAEIs can be considered to be interpersonal comparable money-metric measures of the maximum utility levels, the distribution of the Zs forms the basis for studying longterm inequality and income mobility.
Note that the EAEI can be considered as an analogous to the certainty equivalent in the theory of choice under uncertainty and the equally distributed equivalent income in analyses of income inequality (see Atkinson, 1970 
Annuity as a measure of permanent income
A benchmark case in intertemporal choice theory uses the annuity (A) of the income stream as measure of permanent income (see e.g. Meghir, 2004) . The annuity income is defined by 
Thus, it is clear that A is an appropriate measure of permanent income insofar it is reasonable for the social planner to assume that the real interest rates are constant over time and equal to the rate of time preferences. The behavioural counterpart is that individuals' prefer to carry out equalizing income transfers to achieve a constant consumption level over time. Accordingly, it is apparently required to impose rather restrictive conditions to justify the use of the annuity as a measure of permanent income in analysis of long-term income inequality and income mobility. 
An interesting question is whether
In this case, the ratio between the optimal consumption levels for two arbitrarily chosen periods depends on the instantaneous utility function u, the rate of time preference d, and the real interest rates (r 2 ,r 3 ,…,r T ) but not on the income stream (Y 1 ,Y 2 ,..,Y T ). As demonstrated by Theorem 2.1 below, the consumption profile (2.10) is optimal if and only if the utility function is a member of the Bergson family, which is a much used specification of the instantaneous utility function in intertemporal choice theory (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000) . 
ε is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Proof. Assume that tt1
CqC * * = where t q is defined by (2.11). Now, inserting for (2.10) and (2.11) in (2.3) we obtain the following functional equation
which has the solution (see Aczél, 1966) g0 ≡ or 1, or there exists a real number As will be demonstrated below, the result of Theorem 2.1 proves useful for identifying the relationship between A defined by (2.8) and Z defined by (2.6). To this end, it is convenient to introduce the notation a t defined by (2.12)
Hence, (i) implies (ii
where ? is defined by (2.7).
6 See also Samuelson (1965) . Moreover, Pratt (1964) demonstrates that an economic agent who acts in accordance with the criterion of expected utility when he makes decisions under risk exhibits constant relative risk aversion if and only if the utility function is a member of the Bergson family. 7 For convenience the dependence of k on r 2 ,r 3 ,…,r T is suppressed in the notation for k. 
Credit marked imperfections
When interest rates on borrowing and savings differ then (2.2) is no longer a valid representation of the budget constraints. Consequently, the preferred consumption levels defined as the solution to (2.1) and (2.2) will in this case not form an appropriate basis for defining and measuring the EAEI.
Formally, we can apply the Kuhn-Tucker method to derive the conditional and preferred consumption profiles in the case of imperfect credit markets. For simplicity, assume that each individual is faced with a single borrowing interest rate and a single savings interest rate (but different individuals may face different interest rates on borrowing and/or savings). If there are no liquidity constraints, the preferred consumption profile ( * * *
) is defined as the solution of (2.1) subject to the budget constraints (2.18) is determined as the utility maximising choice among the conditional consumption profiles satisfying their respective budget constraints. By inserting the consumption levels of the optimal consumption profiles into (2.5), the corresponding Z is obtained from (2.6).
Presence of liquidity constraints will reduce the number of available conditional consumption profiles that have to be compared. For example, the case where borrowing in each period is prohibited corresponds to reducing the number of conditional consumption profiles to those satisfying
Thus, deriving EAEI subject to liquidity constraints is straightforward and can be considered as a special case of the method outlined above.
Generalized rank-dependent measures of income inequality
This section discusses how to aggregate permanent incomes across individuals into measures of income inequality and social welfare, when the state of immobility is defined as no changes over time in individuals' ranks in the short term distributions of income. This calls for rank-dependent measures of inequality that can be justified to represent preference orderings over Lorenz curves. By displaying the deviation in each individual's income share from the income share that corresponds to perfect equality, the Lorenz curve captures the essential descriptive features of the concept of inequality. The normative aspect of ranking Lorenz curves will be discussed below. Mehran (1976) introduced an alternative version of (3.1) based on descriptive arguments. For alternative motivations of the J P -family and various subfamilies we refer to Weymark (1980, 1983) , Weymark (1981) , Yitzhaki (1983), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994) , and Aaberge (2000 Aaberge ( , 2007 . 9 Note that Yaari (1987 Yaari ( , 1988 provides an axiomatic justification for using As is generally acknowledged, measures of inequality are required to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, which states that an income transfer from a richer to a poorer individual reduces income inequality, provided that their rank in the income distribution are unchanged. As is stated in Theorem 3 .1 below, the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers is equivalent to the condition of dominating non-intersecting Lorenz curves. A social planner who prefers the dominating one of nonintersecting Lorenz curves favours transfers of incomes which reduce the differences between the income shares of the donor and the recipient, and is therefore said to be inequality averse.
Two alternative families of rank-dependent measures of inequality
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Definition 3.1. A Lorenz curve L 1 is said to first-degree dominate a Lorenz curve L 2 if [ ] ()(),
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LuLuforallu01 ≥∈ and the inequality holds strictly for some ,. u01 ∈ Theorem 3.1. (Fields and Fei (1978) , Yaari (1988) and Aaberge (2001) We refer to Fields and Fei (1978) for a proof of the equivalence between (i) and (ii), 12 Yaari (1988) for a proof of the equivalence between (i) and (iii), and Aaberge (2001) Proof. Since the equivalence of (i) and (ii) follows from Theorem 3.1 it remains to prove that (i) and To prove the converse statement we assume that (3.4) is satisfied for positive non-increasing p and positive non-decreasing q. .5) and (3.6), respectively, we get the following alternative expressions for 1,, jk J and 2,, jk J , 13 Note that the choice ()(1) k puu =− in (3.1) corresponds to the extended Gini family of inequality measures introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980 Note that the integrand of the first term of expression (3.9) is equal to the relative difference between the overall mean income raised by j and the average income raised by j of those units with income lower than the richest as we move up the distribution F. Thus, the 1,, jk J -measure is equal to the mean of these gaps. Alternatively, by relying on the second term of expression (3.9) we see that the 1,, jk Jmeasure can be interpreted as the average of relative gaps between the overall mean raised by j and the average income raised by j of those units with income lower than the maximum income of a random I becomes more sensitive to changes in the upper part of the income distribution, as fewer high incomes are removed from the income distribution. If we increase j, 1,, kk I places even more weight on such changes, because the average income lower than the maximum income of the random sample of size j+k is raised by j.
By the same token, the sensitivity of 2,, kk I to changes in the lower part of the income distribution increases with increasing j and/or k.
Note that (3.12) and (3.13) for j=k=1 provide two new alternative interpretations of the Gini coefficient. Moreover, the average of 1,1,1 I and 2,1,1 I provides the following third alternative interpretation of the Gini coefficient, (3.14) Table 1 provides estimates of the Gini-coefficient, according to (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14), respectively.
The data is generated from a uniform distribution with incomes ranging from 0 to 1000. This simulation example illustrates that it is straightforward to implement the proposed family of rankdependent inequality measures. It is also evident that the estimates come closer to the true value of the Gini-coefficient of one third, as we increase the number of draws.
Table 1. Alternative estimates of the Gini-coefficient
G from (3.14) (914, 760) . Note: The income data is generated from random draws of 1000 observations from a uniform distribution defined over the interval [0, 1000] . Column 1 shows the realizations from random draws of two incomes. Column 2 computes the average income of the observat ions with income lower than the maximum of this pair of incomes. Column 3 computes the average income of the observations with income higher than the minimum of this pair of incomes. The first ten rows of column 4-6 compute the Gini -coefficient by each pair of income draws, according to (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14), respectively. The last two rows provide estimates of the Gini-coefficient for 10 and 100 pair of income draws, according to (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14), respectively.
As is evident from (3.14) , the Gini coefficient can be considered as a "tail-symmetric" measure of inequality. Moreover, expression (3.12) might be used to justify the standard claim (see Atkinson, 1970 ) that the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to changes that take place in the central part of the distribution than at the tails. It should be noted, however, that this property is, as demonstrated by Aaberge (2000) , true only for unimodal distributions that are neither strongly skew to the left or to the right, provided that transfers sensitivity is defined according to Kolm's (1976) 
Inequality and social welfare
Theoretically based measures of social welfare that admits a decomposition with respect to average income (or average individual welfare) and inequality are considered particular attractive since they offer an explicit treatment of the trade-off between "the size and the distribution of the cake". As demonstrated by Yaari (1988) , members of the family of rank-dependent inequality measures (3.1) are associated with the following social welfare functions (3.16)
where µ and L are the mean and the Lorenz curve of F.
Note that the normative justification of (3.16) can be made in terms of a theory for ranking the distribution functions (F), as proposed by Yaari (1987) , or by considering the last term of (3.16) as a value judgement of the trade-off between the mean and (in)equality in deriving social welfare functions, as proposed by Ebert (1987) . A mean-independent ordering of income distributions in terms of inequality, i.e. an ordering of Lorenz curves, forms the basis of Ebert's approach. 
Rank-dependent measures of income mobility based on permanent incomes
This section introduces a family of measures of income mobility that rely on (i) the permanent income measure introduced i n Section 2, and (ii) the generalized family of rank-dependent measures of income inequality introduced in Section 3. In the general case, we allow for individual -specific interest rates on borrowing and saving as well as for liquidity constraints in determining the permanent income. Thus, our measure of permanent income incorporates the cost of making inter-period income transfers, and hence account for the welfare loss that may be associated with income fluctuations.
Consequently, high mobility will be, e verything else equal, strictly socially preferable. The encompassing nature of the proposed family of generalized rank-dependent measures of income mobility is directly linked to the alternative specifications of the credit marked and the intertemporal preference structure.
A generalized family of rank-dependent measures of income mobility
Let L Z and R Z L be the Lorenz curves for the distribution of the observed permanent income Z and the distribution of the hypothetical reference permanent income R Z when there is no mobility. The latter distribution is formed by assigning the lowest income in every period to the poorest individual in the first period, the second lowest to the second poorest, and so on. 
It is straightforward to verify that 0 = M = 1, with strict equality if and only if the distribution of permanent income Z is equal to the distribution of the reference permanent income Z R . Thus , the state of no mobility is defined to occur when the individuals' positions in the short-term income distributions are constant over time. Mobility is measured as relative reduction of the inequality in the distribution of permanent income for a given period due to changes in the individuals' positions and incomes shares in the short-term distributions of income. By explicitly incorporating the cost of making inter-period income transfers in M, and thus the welfare loss that may be associated with income fluctuations, high mobility will be everything else equal strictly socially preferable. Hence, we accommodate the most common criticism measures of mobility as an equalizer of long-term income, namely that high mobility may imply income instability for the individual which will matter for his or her welfare if it is costly to transfer income. Note also that the measure of income mobility defined by (4.1) allows for individual -specific interest rates on saving and borrowing as well as for liquidity constraints.
Measuring income mobility based on average income
The method for measuring mobility defined by (4.1) can be considered as a generalization of the standard measure of income mobility as an equalizer of long-term income, where the average real income over a sequence of periods is used as a measure of permanent incomes. By assuming that the rates of time preferences and the real interest rates are equal to zero in each period, i.e. Mobility measures based on (4.4) may be interpreted as the relative reduction in inequality over the extended accounting period of income due to changes in the period rankings (and incomes) of the individuals over time, when it is assumed to be costless to make income-transfers across periods.
Consequently, analyses based on (4.4) run the risk of mixing the equalising effect of high mobility with the loss of welfare from fluctuating income. Thus, high mobility, everything else equal, is no longer necessarily desirable from the perspective of the social planner.
Measuring income mobility based on annuity income
Making incomes from different periods comparable is not merely a question of accounting for changes in the price of goods; it is also necessary to take the price of consumption into account. The pric e of consumption depends on the real interest rates, which determine how much consumption an individual must give up in the future for being able to consume more today. 
A social welfare approach for measuring mobility
Since R ZZ µµ = when ZA = , the annuity based mobility measure defined by (4.5) can be given the following alternative expressions in terms of the social welfare functions defined by (3.17) and (3.18),
provided that the measurement of inequality is based on respectively (3.12) and (3.13) rather than on (3.9) and (3.10), (4.8)
,,,, , 
Summary and discussion
The notion of mobility considered in this paper has its origin from Friedman's (1962) discussion of the relationship between income mobility and long-term income inequality. This relationship has motivated a considerable theoretical and applied literature, starting with Shorrocks (1978) , who employed a two-step aggregation approach to assess mobility as an equalizer of long-term income.
The first step consists of aggregating the income stream of each individual into an interpersonal comparable measure of permanent income, whereas the second step deals with the problem of aggregating the distribution of permanent incomes into measures of social welfare, inequality, and mobility.
In Shorrocks (1978) as well as in most subsequent empirical studies of income mobility, the average real income over several years is used as an approximation for permanent income. A common objection against this approach, is the fact that it ignores that high mobility may imply income instability for the individuals, which will matter for their welfare if it is costly to transfer income. By disregarding the welfare loss that may be associated with income fluctuations, it is not necessarily true that high mobility will be preferable for an inequality averse social planner. To address this issue, we introduce a measure of permanent income that explicitly incorporates the costs of and constraints on making inter-period income transfers. 15 If the instantaneous utility function of the intertemporal utility function belongs to the much used Bergson family , our permanent income measure is equivalent to the concept of utility-equivalent annuity used by Nordhaus (1973) and Creedy (1999) as a measure of permanent income. Nordhaus (1973) as well as Creedy (1999) express concerns about the sensitivity of analysis of lifetime inequality to the social planner's choic e of preference parameters. In this paper, we demonstrate, however, that their concern is uncalled for, as inequality and mobility estimates based on utility-equivalent annuity measures prove to be independent of these preference parameters.
After aggregating the incomes of an individual into a permanent income measure, we introduce a method for aggregating the permanent incomes across individuals into measures of long-term income inequality, social welfare and income mobility, when immobility is defined as no changes over time in individuals' rank in the short term distributions of income. Since this definition calls for measures of mobility that are derived from rank-dependent measures of inequality, we employ an axiomatic approach to justify the introduction of a generalized family of rank-dependent measures of inequality where the distributional weights, as opposed to the members of the family introduced by Mehran (1976) and Yaari (1988) , depend on income shares as well as on population shares. Importantly for empirical research, it is straightforward to estimate these inequality measures, which supplement each other with regard to sensitivity to changes in the lower, the central and the upper part of the income distribution. A subfamily of this generalized family of rank-dependent measures of inequality is shown to be associated with social welfare functions that prove to have intuitive ly appealing interpretations.
While our paper has considered mobility as the extent to which equalisation of income occurs as the accounting period is extended, Chakravarty et al. (1985) and Ruiz-Castello (2004) proposes mobility measures that tell us how inequality of permanent incomes compares with the inequality of the firstyear incomes. In the latter case, the mobility measures are viewed as a welfare comparison between the actual path of the income distribution and a hypothetical path where there is no change over time from the first-year distribution. A possible advantage of these mobility measures is that they convey whether mobility equalises or disequalises the distribution of permanent income relative to the first- 15 An alternative approach to capture the effect of income fluctuations is found in Zandvakili (1986, 1990) , who replace individual's average income by a measure of the utility of his incomes, where the incomes of the different periods are treated as distinct and substitutable attributes depending on the choice of elasticity of substitution. The role that credit markets play in this measure of permanent income is unclear, as it is not derived from intertemporal choice theory but the upshot of an aggregator function that is derived by appealing to a generalised criterion from information theory.
